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Secondary Liability, ISP Immunity, and
Incumbent Entrenchmentt
Topic VI
More than fifteen years have passed since the two major U.S. stat-
utes concerning the secondary liability of Internet service providers
were adopted-the Communications Decency Act and the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act. The statutes have been criticized; however,
very little of the criticism has come from Internet service providers,
who have enjoyed the benefits of generous safe harbors and immunity
from suit guaranteed by these statutes. This Article raises the question
of whether these statutes contribute to incumbent entrenchment-so-
lidifying the position of the existing Internet service providers to the
detriment of potential new entrants. The current laws and industry
self-regulation may hamper the entry of new service providers into the
market and thereby retard the technological progress that best serves
society.
INTRODUCTION
Critics often view law as lagging behind technology, thereby
hampering technological development and innovation. Innovators
grumble that the law does not facilitate technological development-
not only does it fail to anticipate future technological development,
but it often is not even able to respond rapidly enough to address
current developments. When innovators complain about the existing
state of the law, however, their complaints might actually be a posi-
tive sign in one respect-the complaints indicate that the types of
technological development are occurring that society hopes to en-
courage-developments that were not anticipated when the laws
were drafted. If innovators are silent about or satisfied with the cur-
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rent state of the law, then questions should be raised about the
innovators' contributions to technological development. Technological
development might not be sufficiently progressive if it corresponds
exactly to what was anticipated at the time of a law's drafting by a
legislature, since legislatures are bodies not typically endowed with
particular technical expertise, visionary abilities, or imagination.'
The extremely swift development of the Internet shows how a
revolutionary technology can move ahead of the law. When the new
1976 Copyright Act was enacted, only a few visionaries could have
predicted the Internet's existence, 2 and even in 1996 and 1998, when
Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA)3 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),4 statutes
that included Internet-related provisions, few could have imagined
all the roles that the Internet would play and the range of legal issues
that the Internet would generate in just a few years.5 One would ex-
pect the Internet-related provisions of the CDA and the DMCA to be
primary examples of how a law can lag behind technology and result
in complaints by major innovators in the field about the outdated
state of the law.
However, the provisions of the CDA and the DMCA that address
the liability of Internet service providers (ISPs) for content posted on
the Internet by third parties 6 appear to enjoy the support of ISPs, 7
which are the very same entities that society perceives to be the ma-
1. A legislature may purposefully decide not to legislate for new technologies and
to delay legislating for such technologies until they are fully developed. See Yvette Joy
Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological Advancements,
10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 157 (2010) ("[W]e should proceed with
caution in allowing the potential effects of either technology in its infancy or future
unrealized technology to influence our policy decisions before the science has had a
chance to mature and develop, and its effects on society better determined." Id.). Of
course, it might be difficult to determine when a technology has reached a proper
point of maturation for a legislature to act.
2. E.g., Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to Distrib-
uted Communications Networks, THE RAND CORPORATION (Aug. 1964), http://www.
rand.org/pubs/research memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf. On the creation and begin-
nings of the Internet generally, see, e.g., JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET
(2000); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How TO STOP IT 28-
35 (2008).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
4. This article concerns only one set of the provisions of the DMCA-section
512-the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act. 17 U.S.C. § 512
(2012).
5. See, e.g., In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F.Supp.2d 24, 38 (D.D.C.
2003) ("[P]eer-to-peer (P2P) software and 'bots,' a software tool used by copyright own-
ers to monitor the Internet and detect unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
material-were 'not even a glimmer in anyone's eye when the DMCA was enacted' by
Congress in 1998." Id.).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
7. See infra note 16 and note 103 and the accompanying text for the scope of the
term "Internet service providers" under the DMCA and the CDA.
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jor innovators of the Internet." The CDA and the DMCA are two of
the three U.S. federal acts that limit the liability of ISPs9-persons
or entities that facilitate Internet connections and a wide variety of
other Internet-related services, such as search functions (e.g., Google)
and platforms for posting of content created by others (e.g., You-
Tube). The provisions of the acts immunize ISPs from suit and create
safe harbors from some types of remedies in cases where ISP liability
would or does arise because of acts by users employing ISP services-
acts that are facilitated by the ISP services and that involve illegal
conduct, such as defamation or copyright infringement. 10
The fact that ISPs appear to be satisfied with the CDA and the
DMCA as they have existed since 1996 and 1998 does not automati-
cally mean that ISPs do not innovate at all, or do not innovate
sufficiently in the technology that the CDA and the DMCA affect;
good examples exist of innovation by some ISPs in technological as-
pects that are affected by the CDA and the DMCA." But ISP
satisfaction with the law might also suggest that the law does not
adequately incentivize ISPs to innovate in particular aspects of tech-
nology, and in the worst case scenario, the law could actually
incentivize ISPs to slow their innovation in technology, or constantly
understate the outcomes of their innovation in particular technolo-
gies that are implicated by the CDA and the DMCA.
The CDA and the DMCA were designed to support the develop-
ment of a new and promising industry,' 2 and the immunity provided
8. E.g., Fred von Lohmann, senior copyright counsel at Google, recently said on
behalf of Google that "[w]e believe that the time-tested [DMCA] 'notice-and-takedown'
process for copyright strikes the right balance between the needs of copyright owners,
the interests of users and our efforts to provide a useful Google Search experience."
David Goldman, Google Kills 250,000 Search Links A Week, CNN MONEY (Sept. 9,
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/24/technology/google-search-copyright. On criti-
cism of the DMCA by users, free speech advocates, and copyright owners see, e.g.,
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 631-36 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without
Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986,
1002-05 (2008); Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor:
Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171
(2010); CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
9. The third (less known) act is the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(B), (C)
(2006).
10. For the scopes of the safe harbor and immunization provisions see infra note
15 and the accompanying text and notes 92, 104, 105, and the accompanying texts.
11. See infra for examples of technologies deployed by ISPs to enhance copyright
enforcement. Innovation in the technologies may be conducted by entities other than
ISPs-by third-party suppliers of the technologies, for example. ISP demand for such
technologies plays an important role in incentivizing suppliers to innovate, and ISP
demand can be propelled by legal requirements. For simplification this article identi-
fies ISPs as the primary innovators with the understanding that innovation may be
outsourced to third-party suppliers.
12. "The history of online gatekeeping is ... also one of policy judgment in the
judicial as well as legislative spheres that generative technologies ought to be given
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by CDA's Section 230 and the safe harbor provided by the DMCA to
internet service providers were critical to the early development of
the Internet. However, the CDA and the DMCA may also be contrib-
uting to some ossification in the forms that subsequent Internet
services may take. Additionally, the newly-implemented Copyright
Alert System (also known as "six strikes") may, through self-regula-
tion, provide incumbent firms with advantages that will burden
insurgent innovators.
I. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
The status of ISPs and their potential liability for content posted
on the Internet by third parties, particularly for defamatory and cop-
yright infringing content, has been contested in courts since the early
days of the Internet, and as courts reached different results on the
status of ISPs, 13 an urgent need for legal certainty led Congress to
enact first Section 230 of the CDA, and later the DMCA, which filled
the gap that the CDA purposefully left in the copyright law area. The
DMCA reflected a pushback by copyright owners, who demanded
that ISPs be required to meet certain conditions to benefit from a
limitation on ISP liability, and that a mechanism be created for
takedowns of copyright infringing material.' 4 The DMCA's safe har-
bor provisions concern liability for copyright infringement that may
arise under the U.S. Copyright Act,' 5 and provide specifically defined
ISPs only a safe harbor from damages, not complete immunity from
suit.16
wide latitude to find a variety of uses . Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online
Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 253, 298 (2006). See also 144 Cong. Rec. S8729
(daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) ("We cannot make the Internet
too costly to operate.").
13. E.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995).
14. In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F.Supp.2d 24, 36 (D.D.C. 2003) ("The
legislative history makes clear that in enacting the DMCA, Congress attempted to
balance the liability protections for service providers with the need for broad protec-
tion of copyrights on the Internet." Id.).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). Courts disagree on whether the DMCA extends to sec-
ondary liability that may arise under state copyright laws. See Capitol Records, Inc. v.
MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Es-
cape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2013). See also Federal Copyright Protection
for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, A Report of the Register of Copyrights, December
2011, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf
(last visited Aug. 22, 2013). It is also questionable whether the DMCA covers secon-
dary liability if such liability arises under anti-circumvention provisions of the U.S.
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). It is disputed whether the provision cre-
ates secondary liability. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 107 (2007).
16. The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA are limited to service providers of
"digital online communications" and providers "of online services or network access,
or the operator of facilities thereof' who fall into one of four categories. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(1)(A) and (B) (2012). For the individual categories see 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (b),
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Among the requirements that ISPs must fulfill to benefit from
the DMCA safe harbor is, for some categories of ISPs, 17 compliance
with a mechanism for taking down allegedly copyright infringing ma-
terial. The DMCA outlines the mechanism in great detail; it specifies
the content for notifications that copyright owners must submit to
ISPs if the copyright owners want the ISPs to take down allegedly
infringing material,' it details the counter-notifications that users
may file to defend material that they upload,' 9 and it outlines ISP
takedown and reinstatement actions. 20 The mechanism operates on
two premises: first, that ISPs do not have the technical means to po-
lice content that third parties upload to the Internet and that the
ISPs host or link to, and second, that even if ISPs have those means,
the ISPs are not able to assess whether or not particular material is
copyright infringing because they lack basic information necessary
for such an assessment, including information about the current cop-
yright owner of the material and any licensing arrangements into
which the copyright owner might have entered.
The same two premises that underlie the takedown mechanism
also underlie another requirement-the absence of a certain degree
of knowledge about infringing activity. If an ISP has such knowledge,
the ISP will not benefit from the DMCA safe harbor. 2 ' Much DMCA-
related litigation 22 has focused on the gap between 1) the knowledge
(c), and (d). See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007);
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (deciding that BitTorrent sites
were not covered by 17 U.S.C. §512(a), (b) and (d)). The DMCA also has a special
provision for nonprofit educational institutions acting as service providers. 17 U.S.C.
§512(e) (2012).
17. 17 U.S.C. §512(c) and (d) (2012).
18. 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3) (2012).
19. 17 U.S.C. §512(g)(3) (2012).
20. 17 U.S.C. §512(g)(2) (2012).
21. The absence of knowledge requirement also concerns only ISPs under 17
U.S.C. § 512(c) and (d).
[T]he service provider . . . (A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to re-
move, or disable access to, the material; ...
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012).
22. In addition to the issues related to the actual knowledge requirement and the
"right and ability to control" infringing activity, DMCA-related litigation has con-
cerned issues such as compliance with the definition of ISPs covered by the DMCA,
the requirements for the repeat infringer policy, and personal jurisdiction over a copy-
right owner based on the filing of a DMCA notification. See cases listed supra in note
16; Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109-15 (9th Cir. 2007); Dudnikov
v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008).
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that the DMCA requires the ISP not to have, 2 3 and 2) the knowledge
that the ISP undeniably has once it receives a DMCA notification
from a copyright owner. ISPs, understandably, want no gap to exist
between the two; for ISPs the ideal situation is one in which no actual
or "red flag" knowledge is imputed to them unless they receive a
DMCA notification from a copyright owner containing all the infor-
mation that the law requires. 24 Copyright owners, however, want not
only for a gap to exist, but that the gap be as wide as possible; a level
of knowledge much lower than knowledge based on a DMCA notifica-
tion should suffice, according to them, for ISPs to be presumed to
have sufficient knowledge of infringement, be outside of the DMCA
safe harbor, and be fully liable for secondary copyright infringe-
ment.25 Discussions continue to surface about the state of technology
that is available to ISPs and the potential ability of ISPs to identify
allegedly infringing material without a DMCA notification from a
copyright owner.
The availability of technology that might assist ISPs in identify-
ing potentially infringing material has been the subject of debate
since the DMCA was drafted. 2 6 Other arguments as to why ISPs are
ill-suited to identify and remove content that allegedly infringes cop-
yright have also appeared in the debates-lack of sufficient
information, privacy concerns, the danger of over-enforcement, 27 and
technological limitations have all been argued. The legislative history
of the DMCA shows that in the legislative process ISPs emphasized
their technological limitations, which they said prevented them from
monitoring content for allegedly copyright infringing material. In a
Senate committee hearing, an AOL executive, for example, argued
that an ISP's "duty to act, and to be liable, should be triggered only
when it has actual knowledge of the infringement, and where it is
technically and legally feasible and economically reasonable, to re-
move or stop it."28 He warned that although technological means
were in development, they were "still in their nascent development
stage" and "not likely to be ready for deployment for several years."2 9
A concern that surfaced even in the legislative process was that
by following the then-current state of technology the DMCA would
23. Supra note 21.
24. Supra note 18. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d
1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013).
25. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir.
2013).
26. 144 Cong. Rec. S8729 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft)
(discussing "the capabilities and limits of current technology").
27. E.g., Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet Service Provid-
ers: Hearing on S. 1145 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 32 (1997)
(statement of Roy Neel, Pres. and CEO of the U.S. Telephone Association).
28. Id. at 27 (statement of George Vradenburg, III) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 87 (responses of George Vradenburg, III to questions from Sen. Leahy).
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not provide sufficient incentives for ISPs to 1) innovate in the detec-
tion of allegedly copyright infringing material, and 2) deploy such
technology once it was developed. Although copyright owners agreed
with the ISPs that combating copyright infringement online would
need to be a team effort by ISPs and copyright owners, they wanted
more responsibility to be shifted to ISPs and the legislation to incen-
tivize ISPs to innovate. 30 During a Senate committee hearing the
General Counsel of the Recording Industry Association of America
referred to technological solutions as the achievable "holy grail"3 1 and
questioned the wisdom of limiting ISP liability: "[Ilf the [ISPs] got
their way and got [the] exemption from liability, then what would be
their incentive to deploy the technology?" 3 2 "The more . . . ISPs are
insulated from copyright liability," an attorney representing the Mo-
tion Picture Association of America warned, "the less incentive they
will have to cooperate with copyright owners to protect their
works."3 3 ISPs countered by declaring their commitment to innova-
tion; they argued that because the legislation focused on defining the
absence of knowledge requirement rather than on introducing a tech-
nology-specific standard, the legislation would grow with
technological development and not hamper industry development. 3 4
The effects of the DMCA safe harbor provisions on ISP innova-
tion have not been as grim as some copyright owners feared; ISPs
have not stopped innovating in the area of content identification, and
some have taken steps to assist in fighting copyright infringement on
the Internet that have gone beyond the letter of the DMCA. Some
ISPs have provided content identification tools to copyright owners to
enable them to enhance the copyright owners' ability to identify alleg-
edly infringing materials in order to file DMCA notifications. For
example, YouTube has provided copyright holders with "Content
ID"-a tool that copyright holders can use to identify and manage
potential copyright infringements. 35 The tool compares videos
uploaded to YouTube "against a database of files that have been sub-
mitted to [YouTube by content owners," and "[wihen Content ID
identifies a match between [a right holder's] video and a file in this
30. Id. at 67 (responses of Fritz Attaway to questions from Sen. Hatch) ("Technol-
ogy will likely provide the tools by which . .. ISPs and content owners, working
together, develop and implement efficient and effective method to discover and elimi-
nate infringing activities.").
31. Id. at 40 (statement of Cary H. Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President and
General Counsel of the RIAA).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 68 (responses of Fritz Attaway to questions from Sen. Hatch).
34. Id. at 87 (responses of George Vradenburg, III to questions from Sen. Leahy).
35. How Content ID Works, YouTUBE, https://support.google.conyoutube/answer/
2797370?p=cid what is&rd=1 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). For criticism of YouTube's
delaying the deployment of the technology see Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants
at 13, 37, 45, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 2012) (No. 10-
3270), 2010 WL 4930315.
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database, it applies the policy chosen by the content owner."3 6 Other
ISPs have deployed tools that are designed to identify and remove
potentially copyright infringing material. For example, Veoh intro-
duced "hash filtering" software, which identifies videos that are
identical to any videos that have already been taken down as alleg-
edly copyright infringing and blocks any duplicates that users may
attempt to upload.37 Veoh has also utilized "fingerprinting" technol-
ogy by a third-party supplier, Audible Magic, to identify potentially
copyright infringing content that Veoh either removes or refuses to
post.38
What has propelled the development of the technologies if the
law provides no incentives to innovate in the technologies? As some
predicted, the need to maintain good relations with content providers
has driven ISPs to cooperate voluntarily with copyright owners. 3 9
The technologies may also serve copyright owners indirectly because
information about patterns of copyright infringement on the Internet
can be helpful to content providers that seek to identify material that
is in demand and therefore attractive for companies to offer to users
legally. 40 Reasons other than detecting copyright infringement also
generate interest in the development of content identification tech-
nologies, 4 1 and copyright owners' lawsuits against and financial
investments in ISPs also prompt a more widespread adoption of the
technologies .42
It is important for the development of the technologies that
courts have not penalized ISPs for their voluntary implementation of
36. Id. The policies that the copyright owner may choose are labeled as "mone-
tize," "block," and "track." Id.
37. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1012
(9th Cir. 2013).
38. Id., pp. 1012-13. See Audible Magic, http://audiblemagic.con/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2013). "This filtering occurs even if Veoh never received a DMCA notice
regarding the video." Brief of Appellee Veoh Networks at 13, UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902, 09-
56777, 10-55732), 2010 WL 3706519. Veoh was criticized because it had not deployed
the available technologies earlier. See Appellants' Brief at 63-64, UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902,
09-56777, 10-55732), 2010 WL 3706518.
39. Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet Service Providers:
Hearing on S. 1145 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 87 (1997) (re-
sponses of George Vradenburg, III to questions from Sen. Leahy).
40. Mark Leiser, Netflix Admits Using Pirate Sites to Determine What Content to
License, THE DRUM (Sept. 14, 2013), available at http://www.thedrum.conmnews/2013/
09/14/netflix-admits-using-pirate-sites-determine-what-content-license.
41. See, e.g., Gracenote MusicID®, http://www.gracenote.com/music/recognition/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2013); Jason Papanicholas, Top 5 Apps for Identifying Songs,
EVOLVER.FM (Oct. 12, 2012), http://evolver.fm/2012/10/10/top-5-apps-for-identifying-
songs.
42. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 12, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902, 09-56777, 10-55732),
2010 WL 3708631 (Veoh "only started screening [content] when a later investor, Time
Warner, insisted that this be done as a condition of its investment.").
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content identification technologies. For example, courts have not im-
puted actual or "red flag" knowledge to ISPs simply because the ISPs
have used the technologies, or have had the technologies available
and chose not to use them. In a case involving Veoh, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to impute such knowledge to
Veoh, reiterating that "the DMCA recognizes that service providers
who do not locate and remove infringing materials they do not specifi-
cally know of should not suffer the loss of safe harbor protection."4 3
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in a case
involving YouTube, "the nature of the removal obligation itself con-
templates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material."4 4
Courts have also required "something more than the ability to re-
move or block access to materials posted on a service provider's
website"45 for a finding of the "right and ability to control"4 6 that,
combined with "a financial benefit directly attributable to the infring-
ing activity,"47 would also make ISPs ineligible for the DMCA safe
harbor. In the Veoh case the Ninth Circuit Court confirmed that
Veoh's use of technologies to identify and remove allegedly copyright
infringing material was "not equivalent to the activities found to con-
stitute substantial influence"48 on users' activities, and therefore the
use of the technologies did not constitute a "right and ability to con-
trol" infringing activities. 4 9 Therefore the fact, by itself, that
technology was available to an ISP to identify allegedly infringing
material did not take the ISP outside the DMCA safe harbor-even
when the ISP failed to use the technology (or failed to use it
sufficiently).
Of course, copyright owners have campaigned for greater ISP re-
sponsibility in combating copyright infringements and a requirement
for increased ISP use of technologies to identify and remove copyright
infringing content-technologies that copyright owners insist have
been available for some time.5 0 Copyright owners have accused ISPs
of purposefully avoiding or delaying the deployment of technologies
in order to make their services more appealing by making them avail-
43. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1020
(9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
44. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012).
45. Id. at 38.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) and (d)(2) (2012).
47. Id.
48. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1030
(9th Cir. 2013).
49. Id.
50. E.g., Brief of Appellants at 20-21, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902, 09-56777, 10-55732),
2010 WL 3708623; Appellants' Brief at 21, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902, 09-56777, 10-55732),
2010 WL 3706518.
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able for copyright infringing activities.? 1 Further, copyright owners
have argued that because technologies have been available, ISPs
"could have identified [copyright infringing] material by filtering or
otherwise searching [their] system[s],"52 and because ISPs have had
the capability to remove such material, they should have been held to
have had sufficient "red flag" knowledge and the "right and ability to
control" the infringing activities of their users.
Courts have not agreed with copyright owners' calls for greater
ISP responsibility in combating online copyright infringements and
have not required ISPs to use available technologies to enhance copy-
right enforcement on the Internet. However, courts have adopted an
approach to the absence of knowledge requirement and to the ab-
sence of the "right and ability to control" requirement that will not
motivate ISPs to discontinue innovating various technologies that
would help combat copyright infringements. Consider the potential
outcome if courts were to adopt the opposite approach, i.e. if courts
decided that the mere availability of a technology capable of identify-
ing allegedly infringing content would be enough to cause ISPs to
have a sufficient level of "red flag" knowledge and/or the "right and
ability to control" infringing activity. In such a case the existence of
the knowledge or the "right and ability to control" would take ISPs
out of the DMCA safe harbor and therefore make it unappealing for
ISPs to develop and utilize new technologies. Courts have avoided
this undesirable result that commentators had feared would occur be-
cause the DMCA's absence of knowledge requirement indeed
appeared to be rewarding ISPs who are not deploying technologies
that would assist in identifying infringing material.5 3
Although case law developed so that the law does not penalize
ISPs for deploying the technologies, the statute and case law do noth-
ing to prompt ISPs to innovate. The DMCA includes a requirement
that ISPs "accommodate [... J and do [... J not interfere with standard
technical measures, " 4 but it does not require ISPs to actively seek
technologies that would assist in combating copyright infringe-
51. E.g., Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13, 37, 45, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3270), 2010 WL 4930315; Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 14, Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th
Cir. 2013) (No. 10-55946), 2011 WL 2191541 (pointing out that the defendants did not
use the available technologies to identify and remove copyright infringing content al-
though they did use the technologies to eliminate pornography); Brief of Appellants at
21, 49, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th
Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902, 09-56777, 10-55732), 2010 WL 3708623.
52. Appellants' Brief at 67, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 09-55902, 09-56777, 10-55732), 2010 WL
3706518.
53. Zittrain, supra note 12, at 292.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2012).
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ments.7 Currently, copyright owners are not lobbying for changes in
the statute that would place greater responsibility on ISPs and create
incentives for ISP innovation in copyright enforcement-related tech-
nologies. Given the highly negative public reactions to recent
enforcement campaigns by large copyright owners and also to legisla-
tive attempts to enhance copyright enforcement on the Internet,5 6 it
is not surprising that copyright owners have made a strategic deci-
sion to emphasize the need for more voluntary initiatives by ISPs
rather than to push for changes to ISP legal obligations under the
DMCA.5 7
The situation in the United States is interesting from a compara-
tive perspective.58 Other countries have adopted various versions of
limitations of ISP liability, even though no agreement on the parame-
ters of the limitations has ever been reached at the international
level.5 9 Countries attempted and failed to agree on the parameters,
so it is likely that they will return to negotiations of conditions of ISP
liability in the near future.60 For now, countries' laws differ in the
details of their approaches to ISP liability; other countries' statutes
are far less detailed regarding the parameters of ISP liability than
the DMCA is in the United States. For example, the European
Union's E-Commerce Directive includes four articles on ISP liabil-
ity 6 ' but does not go into the level of detail that the DMCA does.
55. The DMCA includes a provision that states that "[n]othing in [section 512]
shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on ... a
service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating in-
fringing activity..." 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012).
56. See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c)(4)(A)(ii)
(2011). See also the reactions to the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, May 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i property/pdfs/acta
1105 en.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
57. RIAA CEO to Tout Voluntary Anti-Piracy Initiatives as Way Forward, Calls
on Search Engines to Join the Effort Asks Congress to Facilitate Discussion on DMCA
in Testimony Before House Panel, RIAA (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.riaa.com/news
item.php?content selector=newsandviews&news month filter=9&newstyear filter=
2013&id=B6D2A187-624C-2A95-F8D2-70D07FOB10FA.
58. For a recent comparative discussion of the DMCA see, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala,
International Convergence on the Need for Third Parties to Become Internet Copyright
Police (But Why?), 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 189 (2013).
59. Cf. Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
Concerning Article 8. See also Internet Intermediaries and Creative Content, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/Internet intermediaries/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2013).
60. Choice of law issues on the Internet and the resulting uncertainty about
which country's laws govern ISP secondary liability may make an agreement about
an internationally harmonized standard for ISP liability particularly pressing. See,
e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss & Annette Kur, The Law Applicable to
Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 201
(2009).
61. Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Elec-
tronic Commerce, in the Internal Market ("E-Commerce Directive"), art. 12-15, 2000
O.J. (L 178) (EC).
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Although the Directive sets out an obligation for ISPs to remove or
disable access to certain material upon obtaining actual knowledge of
certain facts,62 it does not include provisions on the required level of
knowledge and does not outline a mechanism for a takedown proce-
dure. The lack of details in national implementing provisions has
frustrated ISPs; some ISPs have litigated cases filed against them in
individual countries in order to obtain more guidance regarding ISP
obligations under a country's laws.6 3
Recent decisions by the German Supreme Court have shed light
on the implementation of ISP liability provisions in Germany and the
requirements that German law imposes on ISPs if they want to be
shielded from liability for user content. The decisions arose from two
cases that concerned RapidShare, an online file storage provider, and
raised the question of how much monitoring, if any, an ISP should be
required to conduct in order to be shielded from liability for user con-
tent. Similarly to the DMCA,6 4 the E-Commerce Directive prohibits
European Union member states from "impos [ing] a general obligation
on [ISPs] to monitor the information which they transmit or store,
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indi-
cating illegal activity."65 The Court of Justice of the European Union
has reiterated and clarified the prohibition of general monitoring in
its recent decisions, in which the Court held court-imposed, time-un-
limited, general filtering to be in violation of the European Union
Charter of Fundamental Rights and other EU legislation, including
the E-Commerce Directive.6 6 However, the Directive leaves room for
member states to specify in their national law a requirement for ISPs
to "apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from [ISPs]
... , in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activi-
ties."67 It was the nationally imposed "duty of care" that was
contested in the RapidShare cases; RapidShare insisted that it was
unable to identify potentially copyright infringing content and there-
62. Id., Articles 13(1)(e) and 14(1)(b).
63. E.g., Landgericht Hamburg [LG Hamburg] [District Court of Hamburg] Apr.
20, 2012, 310 0 461/10, 2012 (Ger.). See also Rita Matulionyte, Sylvie Nerisson, The
French Route to an ISP Safe Harbour, Compared to German and U.S. Ways, 42 IIC
55, 63 (2011) (discussing differences among ISP liability standards in European
Union's member states). Eventually courts will also have to address difficult choice of
law issues concerning ISP liability. For discussions of choice of law and ISP liability
see supra note 60. See also proposals for resolving the choice of law issues in AM. LAW
INST., INTELLECTUAL PROP.: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008); CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2013).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012).
65. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 61, Article 15(1).
66. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Societe Belge des Auteurs, Com-
positeurs et Editeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959 ; Case C-360/10, Belgische
Vereinigung van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 277 (Feb. 16, 2012).
67. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 61, recital 48.
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fore could not be required to monitor content that its users uploaded
to its service. 6
8
In RapidShare's first litigation the appellate court, the Dtssel-
dorf Oberlandesgericht, recognized that the ISP was obligated to take
down material once the ISP was notified by a right owner that partic-
ular material was infringing the right,6 9 and also to take reasonable
measures to prevent future infringements.7 0 However, the court re-
jected the argument that the ISP could have any obligation to
monitor content generally, without a notification from a right holder
about specific infringing material. The court pointed out the technical
inability of the ISP to automate such monitoring, including the in-
ability of ISPs to review encrypted content,7 1 and the potential
intensity of resource use if monitoring were conducted manually.7 2
But the German Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court;7 3
it emphasized that while an obligation cannot be imposed to monitor
content generally, ISPs have an obligation to monitor content in "spe-
cific cases"7 4 once a right owner notifies them of infringement,7 5
which includes monitoring of future infringements of the same con-
tent.7 6 The court held that an ISP will be liable if the ISP receives
such a notification and does not do "everything that is for the ISP
technically and economically reasonable to prevent further
infringements."7 7
In the second RapidShare decision the Supreme Court was even
stricter than it was in the first case;78 the Court explained that the
monitoring role of an ISP might be even greater if the ISP promotes
68. Oberlandesgericht Dtsseldorf [OLG] [Dtisseldorf Court of Appeals] Dec. 21,
2010, 1-20 U 59/10, 2010 (Ger.). The liability at issue was the so-called "Stbrerhaf-
tung." See Jan Bernd Nordemann, Internet Copyright Infringement: Remedies Against
Intermediaries-The European Perspective on Host and Access Providers, 59 J. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 773, 782-84 (2012). See also Case C-324109, Opinion of Advocate
General Jaaskinen, L'Oreal v. eBay, 2011 E.C.R. 1-06011, at par. 56 and fn. 31.
69. Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf, 1-20 U 59/10, Dec. 21, 2010, par. 24, quoting
Oberlandesgericht Dtisseldorf, 1-20 U 166/09, Apr. 27, 2010.
70. Id. at par. 24, quoting Oberlandesgericht Dtsseldorf [OLG] [Diisseldorf Court
of Appeals] Apr. 27, 2010, 1-20 U 166/09, 2010 (Ger.).
71. Id. at par. 34, quoting Oberlandesgericht Dtsseldorf [OLG] [Diisseldorf Court
of Appeals] Apr. 27, 2010, 1-20 U 166/09, 2010 (Ger.).
72. Id. at par. 30, quoting quoting Oberlandesgericht Dtsseldorf [OLG] [Dtissel-
dorf Court of Appeals] Apr. 27, 2010, 1-20 U 166/09, 2010 (Ger.).
73. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, I ZR 18/11,
2012 (Ger.).
74. Id. at par. 19.
75. Id. at par. 28.
76. On the need to achieve "takedowns that don't automatically repopulate" see
Cary H. Sherman, Senior Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the RIAA,
Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.ustream.
tv/recorded/38936315 (last visited Sept. 25, 2013), at 50:26 and ff.
77. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, I ZR 18/11,
2012 (Ger.) at par. 31.
78. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 15, 2013, I ZR 80/12,
2013 (Ger.).
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copyright infringement by its users.7 9 Because the lower court had
established in the second case that RapidShare did promote infringe-
ments by its users and benefited financially from the influx of users
seeking to use its services in copyright infringing manners, the Court
held that RapidShare was required to monitor content uploaded by
its users.8 0 The Court did not consider the "general organizational
measures"8 ' that the defendant introduced to be sufficient,8 2 and af-
firmed the lower court decision imposing a "general 'market watching
obligation,"'8 3 which the Court deemed appropriate given the nature
of the defendant's business model.8 4
The difference between the results in the two German cases and
the situation under the DMCA is remarkable. Under the DMCA,
RapidShare would probably benefit from the safe harbor 5 and there-
fore not be required to monitor user content. Of course an ISP's
promotion of infringing activity might lead to a finding of inducement
of copyright infringement in the United States. But the DMCA alone
would not require an ISP to introduce technologies to identify any
content that was potentially copyright infringing, and to avoid in-
ducement, an ISP would also not have to introduce any monitoring.
In this sense German law appears to incentivize ISP innovation more
than U.S. law does because the German Supreme Court requires
more technology from ISPs than U.S. courts do.8 6 Less legislative gui-
dance in Germany seems to allow German courts to adjust technology
requirements based on the current state of technology and respond to
the development of technology and business models. This result is an
interesting example that defies some key comparative law stereo-
types: Typically, the statute of a civil law country would be expected
to be more detailed than the statute of a common law country, and
79. Id. at par. 36.
80. Id. at par. 39.
81. Id. at par. 50.
82. These measures included the creation of a special "Abuse Team" to monitor
potential infringements, introduction of a new provision in the user agreement to
warn users that copyright infringements were not permitted, deployment of MD5 fil-
ters, and providing copyright owners with an interface to locate potentially infringing
material. Id., par. 51-54.
83. Id. at par. 60.
84. Id. at par. 62.
85. In Perfect 10 v. RapidShare, 3:09-cv-02596-H-WMC (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2010),
the court concluded that "RapidShare [was] not likely to succeed on its DMCA affirm-
ative defense" but the reason in this case was that RapidShare did not designate an
agent with the U.S. Copyright Office as required by the DMCA and thus did not meet
the requirements of the DMCA safe harbor. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Since RapidShare
remedied this omission it could probably benefit from the DMCA safe harbor. See
DMCA Agent, RAPIDSHARE, https://rapidshare.com/help/dmca (last visited Sept. 25,
2013).
86. See also Karjala, supra note 58, at 210 ("[T]he obligation [imposed by the Ger-
man Supreme Court] is more than has been required of ISP under section 512 by the
U.S. courts.").
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civil law courts would be expected to be less engaged in "legislating"
than common law courts when interpreting and applying statutes.
The effects of the two German Supreme Court decisions have yet
to be assessed. The effects should transcend the original litigation,
because although the decisions of the Supreme Court are without
precedential power de jure, de facto they provide guidance for lower
courts and thus also de facto case law for the norms that govern ISPs.
It is possible that the second holding will be understood to be limited
to ISPs who actively promote infringements by their users, but it is
also possible that German courts will begin to examine ISP deploy-
ment of content identification technologies (short of general
monitoring) as one factor in assessing whether ISPs should be held
liable for user content.
There is no doubt that the DMCA has played an important role
in the development of the Internet industry and that it has helped to
create an environment that generates a great deal of Internet-related
innovation; some technologies and business models might have not
have been developed without the DMCA. However, the DMCA pro-
vides no incentives for ISPs to discover particular instances of
infringements; although the DMCA, as it has been applied in courts,
does not discourage ISPs from developing technologies that can assist
in identifying infringing material, it provides no incentives for ISPs
to do So. s1 Of course it might be difficult to adjust the DMCA or court
interpretations of the statute to create such incentives; the approach
taken by the German Supreme Court has yet to be tested. Voluntary
initiatives by ISPs who strive to assist copyright owners in combating
copyright infringements are commendable; the question is whether
the technological developments that the initiatives represent are suf-
ficient and sustainable. Missed developments in new technologies
may be troubling for other reasons in addition to the need for copy-
right enforcement; 8 the same technologies could help create and
support the functioning of what has been referred to as the "celestial
jukebox"-an on-demand service securing access to all copyrighted
works from anywhere in the world for a fee; this service would be the
ultimate solution to the problems of transaction costs and potential
underutilization of copyrighted works.8 9
87. Zittrain, supra note 12, p. 292.
88. See Brief of Amici Curiae Stuart N. Brotman, Ronald A. Cass, and Raymond
T. Nimmer in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 18-21, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3270), 2010 WL 5167429 (explaining that an
ISP, such as YouTube, is in the best position to locate and remove copyright infringing
material); Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infra-
structure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 351-54 (2013) (discussing why technological solutions
implemented by ISPs would be beneficial).
89. Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 28-29 (1994). Paul Goldstein has claimed no credit for the celestial jukebox
metaphor.
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II. SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is often cele-
brated as one of the most valuable tools for protecting freedom of
expression and innovation on the Internet. Certainly, Section 230 has
created a liability shield that has allowed for YouTube and Vimeo
users to upload their own videos, Amazon and Yelp to provide mas-
sive numbers of (often scathing) user reviews, and Facebook and
Twitter to offer social networking services to a large portion of the
world's population. And the fact that Canada, Japan, and many Eu-
ropean nations do not have exactly equivalent statutes90 helps
explain in part why most prominent online services are based in the
United States. Nonetheless, as will be explained, like the DMCA, the
CDA may in fact play a role in ossifying the structure of Internet
services.
Admittedly, the immunity that the CDA provided to ISPs and
other service providers was important to their development. Section
230 was enacted in order to provide legal certainty to ISPs that they
would not have to engage in onerous supervision of their customers'
content or else face liability; the fact that this proposition was not
previously free from doubt threatened to inhibit nascent Internet-
based firms. 9 1 Section 230 immunizes or provides safe harbors to In-
ternet service providers from liability for the conduct of others. 92 In
1996 the CDA codified an approach to secondary liability that courts
had established prior to the enactment of the CDA; the approach held
that conduits were not secondarily liable for defamatory statements,
and distributors were secondarily liable only under certain circum-
stances. 9 3 Court decisions established that conduits are not liable for
the content they transmit,9 4 that distributors are not liable for de-
famatory statements in the absence of knowledge of the defamatory
statements, 9 5 and that distributors have no duty to monitor the con-
tent of publications. 96 Courts did not seem to agree on whether and
how the rules should apply to Internet service providers; in one case a
court held that a service provider was a distributor,9 7 and in another,
90. Some have however, addressed this issue subsequently in slightly different
ways. See, e.g., the discussion of the EU E-Commerce Directive, supra.
91. See Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 712 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995).
92. 47 U.S.C. §230 (2006).
93. Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 310 (2011); see also, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distributing
Co, 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
94. Wu, supra note 93, at 310; David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for
Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 373, 398-401 (2010).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1965); Ardia, supra note 94, at 397,
398.
96. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
97. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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a court decided that a service provider was more a publisher than a
distributor because of the content control that the service provider
exerted. 98 The CDA responded to the court decisions by providing im-
munity from liability under defamation law and also under a wide
variety of other laws.
The importance of Section 230 was quickly confirmed in case law.
A key early case clarified that the CDA immunizes service providers
from secondary liability, whether they act as publishers or
distributors:
By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to
any cause of action that would make service providers liable
for information originating with a third-party user of the
service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertain-
ing claims that would place a computer service provider in a
publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service pro-
vider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional
editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content-are barred. 99
The court in that case later explained that the reason this law was
passed was to prevent a chilling of speech and because of the extreme
burden that providers would face if this law had not been passed. 10 0
Notably, the court grounded its conclusion in part on the claim that
the law promotes self-regulation.' 0 ' Indeed, the Copyright Alert Sys-
tem described infra was negotiated in the shadow of Section 230, and
adopted with the specific intent to shape a set of industry norms to
the contours of the immunities provided by Section 230 as well as
DMCA.' 0 2
Importantly, Section 230's coverage has been construed rather
broadly. First, the immunity goes beyond traditional ISPs and addi-
tionally covers "any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users
to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions." 0 3 Entities that have
98. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995).
99. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir., 1997).
100. Id. at 331.
101. Id. See also Doe v. Myspace, Inc, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
("This section reflects [ ... ] the potential for liability attendant to implementing
safety features and policies created a disincentive for I...] services to implement any
safety features or policies at all").
102. Although Section 230 does not by its terms specify preemption of intellectual
property infringement claims (such as copyright), and contains an IP savings clause
in § 230(e)(2), it has been held to preempt federal intellectual property claims. Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
103. 47 U.S.C. §230(f(2) (2006).
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benefited from this immunity include Facebook, Google and Yahoo!
(as an email provider). Second, although it is often argued that Sec-
tion 230 immunizes service providers only for actions in which they
assume the role of a publisher or speaker, courts have applied the
immunity even in cases where the service provider arguably did not
act in that role.10 4 Finally, Section 230 also immunizes service prov-
iders from civil liability that may be based on the provider's
restricting access to certain types of material or on the provider's pro-
viding to others the technical means to restrict access to certain types
of material. 0 5
While the benefits of the CDA to ISPs and other providers of ser-
vices on the Internet seem clear, there are costs, though these are not
very visible. First, by providing immunity to service providers that
merely convey others content, they have encouraged the spread and
imitation of a particular form of Internet enterprise. There might be
positives to Internet enterprises that both generated and published
their own content with a higher degree of reliability, or that exercised
more of a curatorial function over the content of others that they con-
vey. However, Section 230 provides a relatively stark advantage to
those Internet firms that hew to its conditions; all else being equal,
this disadvantages the Internet enterprises that might have chosen a
different tack. If new enterprises are influenced to choose structures
that have already succeeded, that may bolster this effect. Second, and
relatedly, by providing a clear roadmap for avoiding liability, the aid
that Section 230 has given to the early development of Internet ser-
vices may ironically be slowing its subsequent: immunity from civil
liability comes at a cost to those whose otherwise valid claims are
barred; to the extent that technological fixes might have avoided or
reduced the harms that give rise to those claims, there is reduced
incentive to develop such fixes in light of Section 230 immunity.
On balance, Section 230 is almost certainly a net positive over
the history of the development of Internet services in the United
States. However, going forward, there may be reason to ask whether
its helping hand is turning into a crutch.
III. SELF-REGULATION: THE NEW COPYRIGHT ALERT SYSTEM
The Copyright Alert System (CAS, also known as "six strikes") is
an American attempt at implementing through private industry co-
operation a "graduated response" system of the kind other nations
have created through explicit legislation. While self-regulation may
have important benefits, the creation of such a system without active
participation by user representatives has drawn criticism. Indeed,
104. Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). See also Wu, supra note 93, at
327, 328.
105. 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2) (2006).
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the creation of a system impacting users' rights through the coopera-
tion of competitors and industry partners creates concern that the
interests of consumers and of nascent competitors may be subordi-
nated via this system to the interests of incumbent ISPs. Both of
these concerns may tend to entrench incumbent ISPs, by foreclosing
users' challenges to their policies and by producing industry coordi-
nation that may create barriers to new entrants to the industry.
The CAS framework was implemented starting in February
2013, just six months prior to the time of this writing, and was de-
vised through the negotiation and cooperation of several major
industries and firms, notably the industry associations the Indepen-
dent Film and Television Alliance (IFTA) and the American
Association of Independent Musicians (A2IM); Recording Industry
Association of American members Universal Music Group, Warner
Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and EMI Music; Motion
Picture Association of America members Walt Disney Studios Motion
Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Twenti-
eth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal Studios, and Warner
Brothers Entertainment; and the ISPs AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast,
Time Warner Cable, and Verizon.
Though presented as a form of self-regulation, the CAS seems in
part a product of informal guidance by government officials. The Gov-
ernor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, facilitated the negotiations, and
the Obama Administration endorsed the plan, reportedly after Jus-
tice Department officials informally vetted the program. 10 6 Notably,
although the Justice Department (and the FTC as well) provides for-
mal guidance through its business review letter program, the firms
involved did not seek such formal review. Certainly, the level of gov-
ernment involvement did not reach the level of formality-including
statutory language-that has been seen in other nations that have
adopted versions of graduated response (e.g., HADOPI in France).
However, because the CAS was implemented through closed-door ne-
gotiations, some observers allege that the government may have been
able to "cloak its own agenda" as part of a putatively private
agreement.' 0 7
As a result of this development process, the CAS is built on a six-
step process of notification to users. The first and second alerts notify
ISP subscribers that their Internet account has allegedly been used
for copyright infringement and provide an explanation of how to
avoid future offenses. If the allegedly infringing behaviors continue,
the third and fourth alerts are sent, and ask the subscriber to ac-
106. Timothy Lee, What the 1930s Fashion Industry Tells Us About Big Content's
"Six Strikes" Plan, ARs TECHNICA (July 28, 2011), http://arstechnica.comntech-policy/
2011/07/what-the- 1930s-fashion-industry-means-for-big-contents-six-strikes-plan.
107. Derek Bambauer, The New American Way of Censorship, 49-Mar. ARIZ. ATT'Y
32, 36 (2013).
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knowledge their receipt. Should the behavior persist, a fifth alert is
sent and ISPs are then allowed to take "mitigation measures" to stop
further infringement. These mitigation measures include "temporary
reductions of Internet speeds, redirection to a landing page until the
subscriber contacts the ISP to discuss the matter or reviews and re-
sponses to some educational information about copyright, or other
measures that the ISP may deem necessary." 08 Finally, if the behav-
ior continues, and the ISP did not institute a mitigation measure
after the fifth alert, it must send a sixth alert and implement such a
measure. A user who disagrees with the CAS allegations may, at
some expense, seek a hearing before American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA) affiliated reviewers; users may only challenge a
determination based on one of six pre-defined grounds, including un-
authorized use, fair use and public domain due to publication prior to
1923. Given repeat player effects and the fact that AAA works for the
operator of the CAS, the Center for Copyright Information (CCI),
which was founded for the benefit of copyright holders, the review
does not seem likely to guarantee impartiality. 10 9
A major criticism of the CAS is that it represents private govern-
ance without the voice of the governed; some NGO groups, including
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, have criticized the process that
implemented and operates the CAS as lacking direct representation
of user/consumer interests. While the CAS may evolve, by its struc-
ture and the nature of the industry players operating and
participating in it, it is not likely to change in ways that directly re-
flect user demands. The governance structure of the CCI does not
offer a strong role for user voices, and the monitoring of user activity
for alleged infringement is outsourced to a private firm with little
reason to provide avenues for users to voice challenges to the process
or system. As a result, the industry players have effectively negoti-
ated a joint constraint on user demands for change in the way alleged
infringement is treated.
Another major concern with the CAS is that it tends to foreclose
competition among ISPs over their policies balancing user rights with
the concerns of copyright holders. In particular, an agreement among
competing ISPs to effectively shift the burden of proof in infringe-
ment actions to the user effects a de facto significant change in users'
substantive rights. Such an agreement benefits copyright holders at a
cost to users, and it does so through competitors' collusion rather
than by legislative action. To the extent that the CAS becomes an
industry standard, it may effectively raise barriers against new en-
108. Center for Copyright Information FAQs, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMA-
TION, http://www.copyrightinformation.com/faq (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
109. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: Six Strikes Measured
Against Five Norms, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1 (2012).
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trants seeking to provide Internet services. By including the
copyright industry in the deal, it may have ensured that that indus-
try's members will not license content to ISPs who do not adopt the
new model. 1 10 As a result, the CAS may tend to form a barrier to
entry, and possibly, to the innovation of insurgent firms.
CONCLUSION
The DMCA, the CDA and the CAS are not without their benefits.
However, an under-appreciated aspect of these three regimes is the
degree to which they may tend to benefit incumbent firms and ossify
the development of Internet services. As a result, future policymak-
ing should seek to avoid hindering technological development, and
instead should create rules, standards and self-governance that in-
corporate dynamic change in its statutory language, institutions and
application.
110. This may be a classic case of an arrangement in which vertical agreements
are a means to help accomplish horizontal agreements' ends. See, e.g., Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1938); United States v. Apple, No. 12
Civ. 2826(DLC), 2013 WL 4829312 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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